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The Art of Betrayal: The Secret History of MI6, Life and Death in the
British Secret Service. By Gordon Corera. New York, NY: Pegasus
Books, 2013. ISBN: 978-1-60598-398-1. Photographs. Notes. Index.
Pp. 496. $35.00.
Readers are generally well advised to exercise some caution with books whose
titles purport that the contents comprise “The Forgotten Tale of . . . ,” “The Lost
Story of . . . ,” or in this case “The Secret History of. . . .” It is not unusual for
readers of such works to soon discover that the intriguing titles are the work of
the author’s or the publisher’s overactive imagination. That’s not quite the case
here, but in all fairness to readers, the book is also not exactly what the title
would lead one to believe. Reflecting the author’s journalistic background, the
book is not actually a history of MI6, but a far more selective rendering of stories
that might enable one to extrapolate more broadly to gain a better sense of the
history of Britain’s overseas intelligence service, MI6.
Journalist Gordon Corera is security correspondent for the BBC. Educated at
Oxford and Harvard, Corera hosted a three-part series on BBC Radio in 2009
entitled “MI6: A Century in the Shadows.” As a result of that and his years of
reporting on intelligence matters, Corera had enviable access to some of Britain’s
top officials in MI6 and participants in some of its more notorious escapades.
That access clearly informed the contents of his book as well. The style of the
book will mostly appeal to those with little familiarity with the topic or with the
world of intelligence in general, or those simply looking for a good, factual spy
tale. The dramatic storytelling style of the book makes for a compelling read, but
it is not the type of scholarly treatment this subject justly deserves, and it is
somewhat marred by the author’s limited perspective on the topic. Still, there are
reasons it’s worth reading, as described below.
The book follows a mostly chronological line stretching from post-World War II
Vienna to modern day Southwest Asia. Drawing on interviews and first-hand
accounts from participants, Corera constructs the tale of MI6 during those years
by telling the story of the spies and spy masters who played significant roles
throughout them. An important sub-theme woven throughout the book is the
relationship between Britain and its American cousins. In the aftermath of the
Second World War, Britain was faced with an unprecedented financial crisis that
hampered the operational capability of its security services just as the threat of
Communist domination supplanted that of National Socialism. It was the
Americans and the CIA that stepped into the breach, forever changing the
balance of power between British and U.S. intelligence services just as the war
had ushered in the decline of the British Empire and the rise of a new American
superpower. In Corera’s view, both nations’ intelligence agencies thus shared in
the successes and failures, the latter marked most prominently by the treachery
of Kim Philby, which Corera notes highlighted the problems in operations and
“the whole culture of Anglo-American intelligence” (p. 67).
Corera carefully traces the story of Oleg Penkovsky, one of the most important
Cold War Russian intelligence officers to spy for the West. Penkovsky was found
out, tried, and probably executed by the Soviets in 1963, and it seems clear from
the tale Corera relates that the case was still marked by the same carelessness and
bungling that plagued western intelligence at the start of the Cold War era. The
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case marked a turning point in MI6’s history. Remarkably, according to the
author, it restored confidence within the service and established a new era of
professionalism for the future. Given the dreadful mismanagement on the part
Penkovsky’s handlers and the intelligence agencies involved, this is a rather
dubious conclusion. That there was no internal inquiry remarked on, combined
with the fact that the Penkovsky case enhanced the careers of many of those
involved, seems to indicate the existence of a far more serious institutional
weakness in the service. The information Penkovsky provided allowed MI6 to
turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse, but a closer examination of the handling of their
most valuable source raises some serious questions about the service’s
capabilities at that time.
By the time the author moves on to the post-9/11 era, the story becomes less
about MI6 per se, and instead about the interplay between Britain’s Joint
Intelligence Committee, its government on the whole, and the relationship
between the United States and its closest ally. That discussion provides the
context for the events that are illustrated most prominently by the intelligence
failures leading to the invasion of Iraq. The impression conveyed is that of an
MI6 that throughout its history was consistently threatened and insecure, never
more so than after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the removal of the
threat of communist domination left the service questioning its relevance. The
events after 9/11 “offered delivery from those fears” (p. 364).
It must be recalled that it was widely accepted in U.S. intelligence circles that an
increasing reliance on technical and electronic intelligence collection methods
and a decrease in HUMINT capability put us at a disadvantage in Southwest Asia.
The British view leading up to the invasion of Iraq, however, blamed the fact that
Iraq had been relegated to the status of a backwater, low-priority target until 9/11
boosted its importance. Previously reliable MI6 sources being aggressively
tasked to provide information about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq
thus began to over-reach their usual access levels. That, combined with frantic
attempts to enhance its role in rapidly unfolding world events, led MI6 leaders to
elevate unreliable, unproven intelligence straight to Downing Street with little or
no vetting through the services assessment staff. Prime Minster Tony Blair’s
eagerness to partner with the United States and play a co-equal role in a global
war on terror meant that such shoddily vetted information was being shared in
ways that were in no way warranted based on its reliability. Later, many of the
MI6 sources denied ever having made any of the statements about WMDs that
were attributed to them and which helped both the United States and Great
Britain justify the war in the first place.
The book ends with a brief discussion of MI6’s involvement in Libya, but the
overall theme of foul ups prevails. The entire impression conveyed in this work is
that while the history of MI6 can be marked by stories of individual agents’
bravery and successes, the service’s reputation as a whole is less stellar. The
importance of accurate intelligence, no matter how it is collected, and the
appropriate analysis and vetting of that information cannot be underestimated in
terms of its contributions to foreign policy strategy and decision making. If the
trend established throughout this book still prevails, Americans and Britons alike
have good reason to fear that their governments might be making worldchanging decisions on the basis of flawed information or interpretations.
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While it might not be the final word on the history of MI6 as an organization,
Gordon Corera has made a unique contribution to the study of that agency and
the world of intelligence through this useful, thought-provoking, and well-written
book. He illustrates the close ties between the United States and Great Britain in
that area, but perhaps most usefully he documents what can go wrong when
intelligence agencies and their governments establish too close a relationship,
and where the collection and dissemination of information is based on desired
political outcomes rather than practical realities.
Edward J. Hagerty, American Military University
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